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A decade of peace followed Sri I.anha~ long war with Tamil separatists, but the country 
faced new and unanticipated Muslim extremist threats with 2019's Easter bombings. 
Muslim majority and minority countries in South Asia have faced similar security 
problems with f orelgn .fighters from Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, as well as domestic 
recruits, These common challenges warranted exploration of the extent to which these 
countries' de-radicalisation efforts might inform adaptations of Sri I.anha~ existing 
programmes of rehabilitation. Accordingly, this study closely examined literature on 
terrorist disengagement and de-radicalisation and derived criteria by which to assess 
programmes implemented in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. The analysis suggests 
that despite some successes, disconnects between programme goals, delivery, and 
evaluation often limit these programmes. Although the literature an disengagement argues 
for multiple paths, many unrelated to ideology, the selected Southeast Asian programmes 
heavily emphasise correcting wrong interpretations of Islam possibly overweighting this 
component over other dimensions relevant to de-radicalisation. A majority of programme 
participants credit factors such as family, financial incentives, and realisation of harm 
to civilians for their change of heart over the programmes. Certain programmes, 
particularly those that used community engagement to articulate interpretations of Islam 
that bolster non-violence, may offer valuable models for Sri Lanka. However, Sri I.anha~ 
existing rehabilitation programmes are in many ways more comprehensively developed. 
Sri I.anha~ way forward might consider its local context and individualise the programme 
with the help and guidance of psychologists, social service and civil society. 
Keywords: Disengagement, De-radicalisation, Rehabilitation, Extreme 
Islamists, Terrorist Detainees 
INTRODUCTION 
This anic]e analyses the de-radicalisation programmes in Indonesia, Singapore 
and Malaysia for strengths and weaknesses in effecting change and recommends 
how to best neutralise the threat to the Sri l.ankan nation. In the past decade, Sri 
Lanka and other South Asian countries have faced veteran fighters returning from 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, as well as those who have been educated abroad and 
might have become radicalised there. As of 2016, ISIS had recruited fewer than 100 
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youth to fight in lraq and Syria, but the Easter Sunday bombings demonstrated that 
a small number of people can successfully plan and carry out a devastating attack 
(Nanjappa, 2016; Al Jazeera, 2019). According to the United States 2015 Country 
Report on Terrorism, "countries in the East Asia and Pacific Region faced the threat 
of terrorist attacks, flows of foreign freedom fighters to and from Iraq and Syria, 
and groups and individuals espousing suppon for the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (!SIL)" (U.S. State Depanment, 2015, p.3). If border control systems are 
slow to adopt new technologies, it may mean that such individuals will continue 
to enter the country and will be difficult to distinguish without community help 
(Sayakkarage, 2016). 
Programmes to change behaviour and attitudes of those identified as extremists 
represent a promising way to address this problem. Neither an intelligence push 
nor an armed effort alone will ever completely eradicate extremist ideas, as Sri 
Lanka is aware from fighting a 30-year separatist war with the Tamils. As a result of 
this conflict, Sri Lanka developed programmes and approaches for de-radicalisation 
and rehabilitation and in facing emerging threats it will be able to draw from the 
best of its own experiences with the rehabilitation of 11,664 Tamil fighters in 2009 
(Hettiarachchi, 2013, p.4). However, the rehabilitation of Muslim extremists may 
pose a unique set of defence challenges that Sri Lanka has not faced before. 
Thus, this research explored the extent to which Sri Lanka may benefit from the 
experiences of neighbours that have instituted different types of de-radicalisation 
programmes: Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. This study closely examined 
literature on terrorist disengagement and de-radicalisation to derive criteria by 
which to assess programmes implemented in these three countries. These countries 
serve as appropriate comparisons to Sri Lanka based on three criteria. First, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia all represent multicultural societies in Southeast 
Asia, similar to Sri Lanka. Second, all three countries face domestic terrorism as 
a consequence of citizens returning as trained fighters from Muslim conflicts in 
the Middle East. Third, these three countries had established disengagement/de-
radicalisation programmes described in enough detail for analysis. However, it is 
wonh noting some divergences. Unlike Sri Lanka, these countries have multiple 
Muslim extremist groups competing for dominance against one another as well as 
the state. And unlike Sri Lanka, all three share a Pan-Asian terrorist group that strives 
toward a regional caliphate in addition to ISIS-inspired actions, if not branches. 
But, in perhaps the most striking similarity with Sri Lanka, these insurgent conflicts 
have been characterised by massive bombings and other violence targeted at the 
civilian population, as much or more than the state itself. 
The results of this analysis suggest that, despite some successes, the disconnects 
between programme goals, delivery, and evaluation often limit programme 
success. Although the literature on disengagement argues for multiple paths, 
many unrelated to ideology, the selected South Asian programmes overemphasise 
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correcting wrong interpretations of Islam at the expense of equally important 
dimensions relevant to de-radicalisation. A majority of programme participants 
credit factors such as family, financial incentives, and realization of harm against 
civilians for their change of heart over the programmes. Certain programmes do 
offer valuable models, particularly Singapores use of community engagement to 
articulate interpretations of Islam that condemn the use of violence. However, Sri 
Lanka's existing rehabilitation programmes are, in many ways, more systematic 
and thorough in design and delivery. Based on the findings, Sri Lanka might 
consider a disengagement/de-radicalisation programme that separates the terrorists 
from prison, tailors the religious component to local and individual needs, and 
reintegrates ex-terrorists into the community with the help of psychologists, social 
services, and civil society. 
DISENGAGEMENT, REHABILITATION OR DE-RADICALISATION? 
In assessing programmes designed to reintegrate former terrorists into society, 
the first step is to distinguish whether a programme constitutes an effort towards 
rehabilitation or de-radicalisation. If terrorism in many scholars' judgement 
encompasses the pursuit of religious, political, or social goals through violence, 
then this goal in the case of Muslim extremists is to set up an Islamic state (Aslam, 
2018, pp.90-91). De-radicalisation has been variously defined as "persuading 
extremists to abandon the use of violence," to restore a former terrorist to society 
as a holistic individual both mentally, emotionally, economically, and socially," 
through individual or group efforts across human resources, economic, social, 
psychology, or education endeavours {International Crisis Group, 2007, p.1). De-
radicalisation describes the process of re-engaging an ex- or detained terrorist with 
mainstream society and its religious beliefs, including men, children, women and 
supporters of terrorism (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.96). In this way, de-radicalisation 
and rehabilitation programmes pursue "hearts and minds" campaigns to change 
specific behaviours and patterns of thought. 
Rehabilitation encompasses not only cognitive reappraisal of religious beliefs and 
ideology but also psychological change, as well as community and social involvement 
including the family (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.96). Furthermore, according to some 
sources, the rehabilitation process consists of "continuous monitoring" of released 
prisoners to prevent re-radicalisation Oani, 2017, p.8). For the purposes of this 
paper, de-radicalisation and rehabilitation refer only to an individuals, not a groups 
change in thinking and behaving. "Disengagement" is another useful term and 
concept used in the literature to describe a distancing of the individual from the 
group and its goals. This distancing of disengagement is not necessarily a complete 
renunciation of violence in all contexts; for example, violence in the perceived self-
defence of Muslims from hostile groups in other countries might still be seen as 
legitimate. 
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APPROACHES TO DISENGAGEMENT AND DE-RADICALISATION 
Despite multiple approaches to disengagement and de-radicalisation, all 
programmes to socially reintegrate Conner terrorists assume the possibility of 
individual change. Voluntarily leaving terrorism behind entails many different 
motives for individuals (Barrel1e, 2015, p.132). In this context, Bj0rgo (1997, p.31) 
identified push and pu11 factors that make detachment more likely, with the "push" 
of motivators to split with the organization, such as disillusionment, and the "pull" 
of attractions outside the group. Altier, et al. (2017, p.305) asserted that not pull 
but push factors, especially dissatisfaction, disagreements, and disillusion, more 
strongly influence leaving. Building on this concept, Hwang (201 7, p. 2 78) outlined 
the specific factors driving disengagement with reinforcement loops that lead either 
to disengagement or reradicalisation. In tum, Chalmers (2017, p.132) built on 
Hwang to further delineate the disengagement-to-de-radicalisation process. By the 
same token, Silke (2017, p.2) argued that stopping violent behaviour should trump 
any attempts to de-radicalise or change the world view. 
Horgan and Braddock (2010, p.286) reflect this practical school of disengagement, 
and Bj0rgo and Horgan (2009, p.3) asserted that the assumed attitude to behaviour 
(changing attitudes automatically shapes behaviour) link greatly oversimplify the 
true patterns. In the same way, Porta and LaFree (2011, p.6) contended that de-
radicalisation and disengagement need to consider the micro (individual), the meso 
(group level), and the macro (political opportunity structures), and how these levels 
interact Dalgaard-Nelson (2013, p.l) went further than others by prescribing that 
intervention programmes should use behaviour change to influence attitudes, use 
narratives as indirect influence, and employ the terrorists' own motives to exert 
subtle influence. 
Other scholars have argued about the centrality of ideology and delved into the 
psychological processes involved in such ideology as Rabasa et al., (2010, p.27). 
Similarly, Guranatna (2011, p.68) echoed this view and the necessity to restore such 
detainees to a more moderate version of Islam before releasing detainees back to 
the community. Kruglanski et al., (2011, p.203) argued that a search for individual 
meaning in the face of meaninglessness becomes transformed into the adoption of 
a co11ective cause that causes sacrifice up to and including suicide bombing. Thus, 
rehabilitation requires extensive reframing to reduce the threat to society posed by 
violent goals. Based on the thorough review of the literature, the three cases have 
been examined for the approach to behaviour change, the attention paid to pul1 
and push factors, and the level of disengagement achieved. 
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INDONES~S PROGRAMME OF DE-RADICALISATION 
Despite being the most populous Muslim nation on Earth, as a secular state, 
Indonesia champions unity of its racially and ethnically diverse peoples. Its 
population is 87% Muslim, 7% Protestant, 3% Roman Catholic, and 2% Hindu, 
and includes (among others) Javanese, Sundanese, and Malay ethnic groups 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). Likewise, several terrorist groups flourished 
in the country, including local Pan-Asian terrorist group Jemaah lslamiah, along 
with al Qaeda and an ISIS affiliate. All of these groups have committed terrorist 
acts on the nation's soil. Accordingly, Indonesia has the deepest experience in de-
radicalising extremists responsible for the Bali bombings that killed a few hundred 
civilians and a series of Jakarta suicide bombings (in 2003, 2009, 2016, and 2018) 
that targeted Western hotels, killing civilians, acts on the same scale and ferocity as 
the Easter bombings in Sri Lanka in 2019. 
Ten years after the Bali bombings, Indonesia had detained 900 terrorists, who 
were responsible for killing more than 200 people (Sukabdi, 2015, p.36). Of those 
detained, less than 200 represented Jemaah Islamiahs Jihadi prisoners (some from 
smaller terrorist groups), and a few were veterans of the Soviet-Afghanistan conflict 
(Schulze, 2008, p.2). In 2013, llO Indonesians joined al-Nusra, a group linked 
to al Qaeda, and some trained with ISIS in Syria Oones, 2015, p.2). In 2014, the 
presence of these hardened fighters on Indonesian soil worried the government as 
did an ISIS YouTube challenge by a particular fighter, Bahrum Syah Oones, 2015, 
p.2). Since only a few of the prisons and detention centres across Indonesia had a 
core constituency of terrorists, the government focused its de-radicalisation efforts 
on key prisons and on Jemaah Islamiah, which represented half of these detainees 
(International Crisis Group, 2007, p.2). 
Purpose and Scope 
Indonesia employs both a hard and a soft approach to counterterrorism. The 
soft approach includes de-radicalisation efforts. After the Bali bombings in 2002, 
Indonesia set up a police counterterrorism unit, Detachment 88 to acquire 
intelligence and prosecute terrorists (Allard, 2016). Allard's 2016 reporting praised 
the unit for breaking up 54 plots as of 2010, but pilloried its flagrant violations of 
human rights. The country neutralised immediate threats by detaining terrorists. 
The police made arrests in Indonesia, but the military took over the de-radicalisation 
programme in prisons in 2010 as a wing of the National Counter Terrorism Agency 
(Indonesian: Badan National Penaggulangan Terorisme abbreviated as BNPT) 
Oones, 2015, p.3). The police initially aimed to acquire intelligence, to leverage 
Jemaah lslamiahs conflicts over the legitimacy of using violence to obtain its goals 
and decapitate the organisation by removing its leaders from prison (International 
Crisis Group, 2007, p.12; Schulze, 2008, p.l; Rabasa et al., 2010, p.92). 
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The BNPT defined de-radicalisation as "any effort to transform radical beliefs 
or ideology to non-radical ones," and mapped out four stages: "identification, 
rehabilitation, re-education and resocialization" (2013, p. 7). This document laid 
out Indonesias "soft approach" to de-radicalisation: a "person-to-person" effort to 
challenge Jihadi beliefs toward government as thought (anti-Islamic) by establishing 
a respectful, trusting relationship with the prisoner. According to Sumpter (2017, 
p.119), another overriding goal of the BNPT was to replace Muslim extremist ideas 
with Indonesian nationalist principles of Pancasila (one God, one nation, one 
humanity, justice for all, and government by the people). To Sumpter and several 
other scholars, this programme presumed that ideology drives terrorism and 
misguided ideas needed to be replaced or altered to disengage these individuals 
from violence. Furthermore, the programme also assumed that demonstrating 
the personal warmth of government officials toward Muslims through a kindness 
offensive would create greater trust in the state (International Crisis Group, 2007, 
p.13). The disengagement approach in prison becomes one of engaging the detainee 
in a process of personal change. 
Programme Components: Relationships, Cultural Approach, and 
Incentives 
In the Indonesian programme, staff became the key agents of change. The Indonesian 
Armys efTorts with Darul Islam, the precursor to the Jemaah Islamiah, had achieved 
mixed results using "compassion, conciliation and business concessions" to change 
attitudes {International Crisis Group, 2007, p.14). WithJemaah Islamiah, police 
acted as change agents and if the detainee showed a willingness to change, the next 
phase employed Islamic scholars to engage in debates and dialogues to "correct" 
Jihadis' understanding of Islam (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.12). Eventually, 
the programme used staff exclusively, dropping the Islamic clerics, who were not 
respected by the fundamentalist terrorists (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.107). In this way, 
programme staff exclusively, not representatives from civil society, administered 
this programme. 
In the education and rehabilitation phases, staff worked one-on-one with 
prisoners, establishing trusting relationships and using a variety of incentives 
to shape attitudes and behaviour. That is, detainees showed greater respect and 
inclination to listen to those who knew the group through arrest and detention 
(Rabasa et al., 2010, p.107). Originally administered by Detachment 88 to acquire 
intelligence, this function later fell to BNPT in 2010 as a part of its prevention 
of terrorism (Suratman, 2017, p.141). Before and after the Jakarta bombings in 
2009, the programme depended largely on personal relationships, private rather 
than government monies, and the use of financial, familial, and social incentives 
to tum the detainees away from violence (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.94,97,108). Such 
incentives included things like paying school fees for children, paying medical 
hills for spouses, paying travel to allow family to visit, providing food, extending . 
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privileges such as furlough, and identity cards and papers upon release from prison 
(Schulze, 2008, p.l). In the assessment of one senior officer, these economic 
tools always trumped ideology, a view echoed by an ex-terrorist interviewed who 
mentioned the need for an ueconomicjihad;" however, the majority of programme 
panicipants credited their transformation to an awakening to the consequences 
of their actions (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.13; Sukabdi, 2015, p.42). 
The success of such incentives seems to support the position that disengagement 
follows different paths in cascades of awakening, not a single one. 
In the re-education phase, which is not made clearly distinct from rehabilitation in 
the BNPT document, staff engaged with the inmates in a "cultural interrogation" 
approach to subtly engage in dialogue about Islam to change ideas. The outcome 
or effectiveness of such an approach depends on the staffs knowledge of Islam, 
not to mention that of the detainee. Unfortunately, neither the BNPT Blueprint nor 
the documents written about the programme detail what "cultural interrogation" 
as opposed to religious dialogue consists of. On the one hand, Police Brigadier 
General Surya Dharma, former commander of the Bali Bombing Task Force, 
championed returning these detainees to the "true Islam", yet on the other, the 
BNPT documents emphasised achieving greater loyalty to Indonesian nationalism 
(National Center Terrorism Agency, 2013, p.35). In the view of the International 
Crisis Group (2007, p. l 5), rehabilitation efforts should avoid religious challenges 
to Jihad and should instead encourage rethinking the costs/benefits of specific 
actions. Furthermore, "structured discussions" achieve better results than "informal 
conversations" {International Crisis Group, 2007). The same document goes on to 
detail how religious dialogue outside of prison between traditionalists and salafis, 
or more extreme Islamists, on Radio Hang worsened tensions between the two 
groups, rather than providing insight. Despite achieving some success, this re-
education phase, too, seems ad hoc rather than systematic and opaque given the 
lack of detailed outlines or protocols for such interrogations. 
Using Ex-Terrorists to Disengage Others 
Finally, an additional element of the Indonesian de-radicalisation programme was 
the use of ex-terrorists to convince detainees to give up violence. The programme 
approached Malaysian Nair Ahas and Ali lmron, two key Jemaah Islamiah leaders, 
and gave them a set of special privileges, then sent them out to talk with other 
prisoners (Rabasa et al., 2010, pp.111-113). Ahas had fought in Afghanistan 
against the Soviets, returning to Malaysia when Muslims began fighting each other 
and served in a variety of roles in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. He 
denied involvement in the Bali bombing. Ahas claimed to be conflicted about the 
civilian loss of lives in the Christmas 2000 bombing and questioned its effectiveness 
in advancing the cause (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.111). The same account documents 
the surprise Ahas felt at the kindness showed to him in his first meeting with a 
Christian interviewer, and a similar impression of a task force commander who met 
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with him alone in a cell without handcuffs. Furthennore, the fact that he was not 
tortured played a role in his attitude change (Horgan and Braddock, 2010, p.288). 
He urged current Jemaah Islamiah members to make a "return to the right path of 
Islamic teaching" (Taylor, 2006). Additionally, he readily agreed to assist the police 
to prevent what he deemed sins against unanned people and went on to participate 
in interrogations and attend police raids of former comrades. Although difficult to 
believe, Martin Abbugao (cited in Abuza, 2000, p.198) reported that a week before 
police could interview capturedjemaah Islamiah members, Bin Ahas engaged them 
in personal conversations about violence against civilians. Furthennore, he has 
helped police at many levels from investigations to arrests, to rehabilitation, and 
larger engagement with society. He claims to have worked with 150-200 detainees 
with mixed success (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.113). 
Ali Imron, one of the Bali bombers, also chose to help the police. Although 
originally denying his involvement in the event, he eventually confessed to making 
the bombs, training the suicide bombers, and delivering them to their destination, 
planting a bomb at the U.S. Consulate, and escaping by motorbike (Counter 
Extremism Project, 2020). In September 2007, he shared these thoughts in a radio 
interview in Jakarta: 
I help the police because I know what the terrorists think. I know how they 
will try to get their weapons and explosives. I know what kind of place they 
will target for what kind of action and I know how they would carry that out. 
I know how to hide from the police on the run, how the terrorists recruit 
new members and who is most vulnerable to the radical message. I am giving 
all this information to [the] police so I can help stop violence and terrorism 
(Martin, 2007). 
Although this quotation seems to reject violence, other sources interpret Imron's 
rationale as more instrumental than moral. According to the International Crisis 
Group (2007), he did not attribute his change to rethinking Islam, but to the public's 
disapproval of jemaah Islamiah's violent tactics. Furthennore, Imron believed that 
Indonesia's "immorality" made it a legitimate target of attacks (International Crisis 
Group, 2007). At the trial, he testified that the West had been the target of the attacks 
because of its treatment of Muslims (Counter Extremism Project, 2020). Yet Imron 
sought forgiveness from victims of the bombings in face-to-face meetings in 2016, 
fourteen years after the attacks (O'Brien, 2007). In these meetings, he attributed his 
previous violent behavior to "obeying his leaders" (Cockburn, 2016). In a meeting 
with a son who lost his father, he asked for forgiveness and said thatjemaah lslamiah 
leaders had assured him that killing Americans was in keeping with Islam (Henschke 
and Nurdin, 2020). Reportedly, Ali Imron's mentee Arif contended that while 
bombing civilians was improper, violence could still be a legitimate tactic (Hwang, 
2017, p.279), but it is unclear whether this was an opinion that Imron shared. 
Whatever Imron's level of disengagement, in his rehabilitation efforts he intervened 
directly and indirectly: working with detainees, pleading with family and friends, 
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and creating cassettes and books to influence others (Horgan and Braddock, 2010, 
p.273). Interestingly enough, an NGO featured him in a book, When Conscience 
Speaks, as a comic book character advising young people (Murphy and Sari, 201 O). 
Indonesian officials hailed his efforts as evidence of successful de-radicalisation. 
However, his conflicting statements suggest that successful disengagement from 
violence against the state may not require a complete repudiation of ideology. 
Programme Evaluation 
Despite cenain successes, external evaluations of Indonesia's Detachment 88 
disengagement programme pinpoint more weaknesses than strengths. First, 
terrorists had to be held a pan from the general population, either in prison detention 
centres or in police prison wings with privileges, because including them with 
the general population was expected to breed more terrorist activity {International 
Crisis Group, 2007, p. 7). Second, the presence of gangs and pervasive corruption in 
the prisons made it difficult to administer the programme without undue influence. 
Third, originally members of the Detachment 88 countenerrorism unit worked with 
the terrorists, but as the numbers grew, programme staff took over. Unfortunately, 
the most well-trained graduates of the Corrections Science Academy chose not to 
work in prisons, and few guards had the social science background to work with 
terrorists (International Crisis Group, 2007, p.6). Furthermore, numerous anicles 
have described the Indonesian approach as ad hoc because it does not follow a set 
of systematic steps, does not include a pre- or post-assessment, and lacks either an 
objective set of measures to gauge change or a long-term follow-up with graduates 
of the programme (Schultz, 2008, p.2; Rabasa et al., 2010, p.8; International 
Crisis Group, 2007, p.16). Sumpter goes even further to say: "If programmes are 
to have any chance of success, they need to be structured, persistent, and highly 
personalized" (2017, pp. 129-30). Such an approach seems hard to replicate across 
prisoners and prisons, let alone countries. 
Likewise, the Indonesian programme never systematically evaluated how many ex-
Jihadis were integrated into the community, or with what results. The absence of 
high-profile terrorist events in Indonesia since the programme's inception has been 
used as the only metric for success, but the lack of such events may be the result of 
many other factors (Jones, 2015, p.3). To critics, the programme merely identified 
and incentivised those already rethinking violence, not the most committed 
jihadis (Schulze, 2008, p.l). Sukabdi's prisoner interviews (2015, p.43) confirmed 
this finding: prisoners attributed change not to the programme but life events. 
Of those interviewed, 97% credited an awakening to war, the impact on family, 
being arrested, or meeting bombing victims. Only 19% credited the programme. 
Unfortunately, these interviews were not taped or documented in written form. 
Only detainee questionnaires remain, with no opportunity for deep engagement or 
detailed notes; this self-report lacks in-depth qualitative analysis and the validation 
of follow up post-release. Likewise, Hwang's interviews with 50 prisoners were also 
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all self-reported and could not be triangulated with subsequent arrest records or 
measures of community acceptance to verify the changes that the prisoners claimed. 
The highly personalised, ad hoc nature of this programme seems quite puzzling, 
given the large number of subjects, the military involvement, and the high stakes of 
releasing bombers back into the population. 
SINGAPORE'S DE-RADICALISATION PROGRAMME 
Singapore represents a multi-ethnic state with 7 4% Chinese, 13% Malays (including 
Indonesians), 9% Indians and Sri Lankans; the country is 14% Muslim (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2020). In its pursuit of a Pan-Asian state, Jemaah lslamiah 
has launched attacks on Singaporean soil, and ISIS has established affiliates that 
threaten state security (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). The country has 
disrupted terrorist plots made up of professionals, both scientists and businessmen, 
some of whom had been trained in Afghanistan by al-Qaeda, possessing advanced 
training in bomb-making, sniper tactics, and assassination (Rabasa et al., 2010, 
p.110). By the same token, in its pursuit of a Pan-Asian state,Jemaah lslamiah has 
launched attacks on its soil, and ISIS has established affiliates that threaten state 
security (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). Singapore'.s detention of an adherent 
of Zahan Hashim, whom Sri Lanka identified as the imam plotter of the Easter 
bombings, link the county most closely to Sri Lanka'.s extremist violence (U.S. 
Department of State, 2019, p.1). Likewise, Singapore'.s emphasis on preventing and 
disrupting terrorist plots might bear the closest analogue for Sri Lanka at this time. 
Like the Indonesian programme, Singapore'.s programme uses close relationships 
with case officers to help prisoners process their own attitudes and feelings. 
This stage of trust-building aims to let detainees move through a process akin to 
grief: denial, anger, and finally acceptance of their situation, perhaps questioning 
the tactics and goals of the terrorist group (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.97). But since 
Singapore'.s law supports "preventive detention," people who pose a threat may be 
detained without charges indefinitely (Rabasa et al., 2010, p.96). Thus, those who 
are resistant to change can be held away from society. 
Unlike Indonesia, the government of Singapore partnered with the Religious 
Rehabilitation Group, composed of volunteers, university scholars, and Muslim 
leaders to design an approach to changing the thinking of terrorist detainees, 
requiring these staff members to undergo additional training (Ramakrishna, 2009, 
p.2). Assuming wrong ideas about Islam needed to be corrected, the programme 
staff reviewed thejemaah Islamiahjihad Manual to betterunderstand the ideological 
challenge. Ultimately, some hard-core adherents proved too difficult to rehabilitate 
even as others embraced a second chance. 
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In Singapores programme, social service agencies, not guards, delivered social 
welfare to families: paying utility bills, finding them jobs, arranging education for 
the children (Ramakrishan, 2009, p. 3; Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 99). As with Indonesia, 
the programme established no metrics with which to analyse its success other 
than a lack of attacks as an indicator. Furthermore, academics contend the lack 
of coordination between the police and the military puts them at cross purposes: 
suppressing crime vs. protecting territory (Suratman, 2017, p.150). With only a 
handful of terrorists ever detained, the ability to hold detainees indefinitely, and the 
strong civil society engagement, it seems the most successful of the three. 
MALAYSIAN DE-RADICALISATION PROGRAMME 
Although Malaysia is a diverse society, ethnic Malays possess greater citizenship 
rights than residents who are ethnic Chinese or Indonesians. One can only be a 
citizen if born to a Malaysian and "by law, all Malays are Muslimn (Lockhard et 
al., 2020). Yet despite this privileged position, 116 Malaysians left for Syria and 
Iraq (Hanschke and Nurdin, 2020). Like Indonesia and Singapore, Malaysia is 
challenged by the Pan-Asian group, Jernaah Islamiah, as well as ISIS branches or 
affiliates, and the population has been a source of support for al Qaeda (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2020). Since 2001, the country claims a success rate of 97% in 
rehabilitating terrorists, based only on whether those released conducted terrorist 
plots (Hanschke and Nurdin, 2020). 
Malaysia's programme diverges from and echoes some of the elements in the 
Indonesian and Singaporean cases. As a Muslim-majority state with a dual civil 
and shariah court judiciary, an NGO leads prisoners in monthly religious training 
in conjunction with psychologists and the Islamic Affairs department (Rabasa, 
2010, p.105). Those prisoners who express sympathies with programme-approved 
interpretations of Islam progress to a second phase of religious dialogue (Aslam, 
2018, p.95). As shariah law already governs parts of Malaysia, the state underscores 
its status as an Islamic state (Rabasa et al, 2010, p.105). Since detainees eventually 
re-join families, the programme involves spouses, too. As with Indonesia and 
Singapore, Malaysia also provides financial assistance to detainees and families, 
including a stipend upon release (Karnaruddin et al., 2017, p.45). 
Of those scholars who have attempted to evaluate the programme, some found 
the task of assessing the programme's effectiveness to be difficult, while another 
suggested specific tweaks. In 2010, prisoners could not be interviewed, but by 
2017, ex-terrorists' answers reflected a range of responses on a hard vs. a soft 
approach: some recommended punishment, others more humanitarian efforts, 
and yet others a tailor-made approach. As with Hwang's study, Kamaruddin et al. 
(2017) depend on self-report, with no comparison to later behaviour or measures 
of community acceptance. Disentangling whether the lack of new terrorist plots 
27 
in Malaysia stems from good intelligence, people's natural disengagement, or the 
effectiveness of its programme is difficult to ascertain. Malaysia's status as a Muslim-
majority state represents a decided strength because it understands the differing 
interpretations of religious texts and how to talk about them. 
DISCUSSION 
Sri Lanka's own rehabilitation and disengagement programme with LITE soldiers 
in 2009 contained far more systematic elements than the Indonesian, Singaporean, 
and Malaysian programmes reviewed above. It benefited from a detailed programme 
design based on psychologist input, clearly spelled out levels of programming, and 
extensive education and rehabilitation elements. In my view, Sri Lanka stands to 
learn more from its own past efforts than it does from these three programmes from 
abroad. 
This paper's survey of programmes provides several insights for rehabilitation efforts 
in Sri Lanka's current context. First, the analysis of the Indonesian, Singaporean, 
and Malaysian programmes suggests that programme goals should emphasise 
disengagement from violence, rather than de-radicalisation that may take decades 
to complete. Additionally, the empirical studies of terrorist attitudes in Indonesia 
and Malaysia suggest that people disengaged from terrorism for multiple, multi-
layered reasons, beyond purely ideological ones. This latter point suggests that 
future programmes should focus on engagement in society, and not overemphasise 
ideology. Programme design should also address attitudes toward war, individual 
responsibility to others, and one's place within the family. Sri Lanka might take all 
of these lessons into account in the future. 
Although all three programmes have had some successes in "disengaging" 
terrorists, pinpointing exactly which aspects of the programme work best, and 
how to replicate them proves difficult, given the highly personal nature of the 
Indonesian programme and its use of ex-terrorists, the extensive use of the Religious 
Rehabilitation Group in Singapore, and the use of multiple players of civil society 
m Malaysia's programme. 
Despite the conflicting scholarship about the variety of "push" and "pull" factors and 
their role in disengagement/de-radicalisation, all three countries put ideology at the 
centre of their programmes. Indonesia aimed to disengage terrorists from violence 
and replace their extremist ideology with a renewed belief in the secular values 
of the nation. The documents suggest that the nation did not demand rejection 
of all extremist beliefs, but instead emphasised rejection of extremist behaviours. 
Singapore presumed that replacing or correcting the wrong ideas about Islam 
would disengage terrorists from violence (Rabasa, 2010, p. 96). Likewise, Malaysia 
also focused on the re-education of prisoners to alter their religious interpretations 
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and political ideas (Aslam, 2018, p. 94). Yet the interviews by Hwang in Indonesia 
and by Sukabdi in Singapore suggest many different drivers and an individualised 
process of disengagement that may or may not reach full de-radicalisation, 
supporting a more tailored approach that pays attention to many aspects. 
Indonesias experience demonstrates that engaging a change in ideology demands 
identifying a credible messenger that the terrorists can respect, someone with in-
depth knowledge of the religion. Following from this, in the context of a mixed 
society such as Sri Lanka that has not completely reconciled its three communities 
Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim it may be valuable to consider incorporating and 
involving the local Muslim community and civil society in any formal programme. 
Identifying credible messengers and civil society organisations would require those 
who know the community well to work in conjunction with professionals skilled 
in assessment and evaluation. A professionally designed programme that employs 
civil society and social service staff could assure the choice of a credible messenger 
regarding Islam within Sri Lankan society. 
In programme delivery, Indonesia used strong personal relationships just as Singapore 
did. Whereas, in Indonesia, this relationship remained in force up to and including 
release, in Singapore, this relationship was an entry point before exposing the 
detainee to different people and ideas in dialogue. For both, a ukindness offensive" 
was applied with the goal of changing detainee attitudes toward government, and 
it seemed quite successful for both. Singapores Religious Rehabilitation Group 
and its civil society components systematically engage the detainee in ways not 
done in Indonesia. Singapore delivers far more training for these volunteers than 
Indonesia does for its staff. Sri Lanka might consider combining elements of both 
of these models: use a key case officer throughout the process, and vigorous civil 
society engagement. The officer would establish continuity and help the client feel 
supported throughout the process, while the local community involvement would 
ensure greater integration and validation within the community itself. 
Indonesias use of ex-terrorists to dissuade prisoners from violence bears examination 
for Sri Lanka. Although its two stars, Abbas and Imron, did not abandon all of 
their extremist beliefs, judging from contradictory statements in the record, they 
successfully disengaged a number of terrorists in custody and within society. 
Indonesia employed this strategy because these leaders had greater credibility with 
terrorists than moderate Islamic scholars in Indonesia, but the strategy may be 
time-limited and selectively rather than universally applied. Imrons meetings with 
victims seemed successful for both sides, but such experiences were not universal. 
In Indonesia, these two former terrorists had been leaders for decades and inspired 
a following for their high-profile bombings. Sri Lanka might evaluate the potential 
of using disengaged or rehabilitated individuals, even those without such influential 
backgrounds, as candidates to educate youth who might be attracted to the cause. 
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Following Indonesia's model, such people should first meet their victims face-to-
face for professionals to judge their depth of regret. With this experience and other 
evaluations, the professional psychologists could identify likely "influencers," and 
the local civil society organization would need to approve them. More tangible 
hope for a place in Sri Lankan society would also be required to dissuade at-risk 
youth from extremism. 
All three Southeast Asian programmes offered financial assistance and different 
levels of job skills and job placement to these former terrorists. Singapore offers 
the best model of this programme element because it was done more systematically 
and involved continuous communication between civil society organisations and 
the social service staff instead of dependence on a single individual as in Indonesia. 
Paying ex-terrorist's expenses is difficult to justify to the broader public, given the 
harm done, so a serious evaluation of how to off er and evaluate such assistance 
would seem well-advised for Sri Lanka. By the same token, adopting Malaysia's 
"continuous monitoring" with both formal and informal check-ins would suppon 
successful reintegration and dissuade reengagement with terrorism. 
Evaluation seems lacking in all three programmes. The Indonesian programme 
does not clearly distinguish education from rehabilitation, have any formal intake 
or release evaluations or metrics with which to measure success. Singapore does not 
fare much better on this score either, although its programme is more systematic, 
with a phase 1 and a phase 2 for re-education in Islam, depending on an evaluation 
(not specified) of the prisoner's progress. Malaysia has one aspect in its favour and 
that is "continuous monitoring" once detainees have been released back into the 
community. In this way, Sri Lanka needs to adhere to its own best practices for 
evaluation for success because its systematic approach exceeds those used by its 
neighbours. 
Considering all of these elements, the findings of Hwang, Horgan, and others who 
interviewed ex-terrorists in Indonesia demonstrate that the "change of heart" must 
balance justice for the victims with restoring these ex-terrorists to the community. 
Detaining most of them indefinitely creates resentment and breeds greater resistance, 
but letting them out without creating job skills, and preparing the community to 
accept them would guarantee a repeated cycle of violence. The high stakes for 
society demand that any future rehabilitation programme be carefully designed 
and recorded, properly weighting push and pull factors beyond ideology alone, 
triangulating formal and informal evaluations that are documented, and conducting 
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